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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, we present a novel OpenStackmodule called regsite for enabling easy access for researchers
to OpenStack research clouds. Many researchers have an account in an Academic AAI federation, such
as national research and education federations or the eduGAIN SAML meta-federation. The software
solution presented here makes it possible to use these institutional accounts together with so-called
virtual organization managers for authenticating and authorizing in OpenStack instances in a clean and
secure way. An analysis of earlier generations of OpenStack-related developments trying to tackle the
same problem is given.Many aspects of this software integration can be generalized to serve as a template
for federative research cloud access.
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Code metadata
Current code version V1.0
Permanent link to code/repository used of this code version https://github.com/ElsevierSoftwareX/SOFTX-D-17-00009
Legal Code License Apache 2.0
Code versioning system used Git
Software code languages, tools, and services used Python, Django, html, OpenStack Keystone service
Compilation requirements, operating environments & dependencies The software does not require compilation. It can be operated on OpenStack KILO or
newer, with Keystone API v3.0 or newer.
If available Link to developer documentation/manual https://github.com/burgosz/openstack-horizon-shibboleth/blob/master/README.md
Support email for questions Mihaly.heder@sztaki.mta.hu
1. Motivation and significance
The SAML protocol, which is implemented by national research
and education federations and the eduGAIN [1] meta-federation is
the de-facto standard for authentication and authorization in the
global research community. The majority of nations of the Ameri-
cas, the majority of EU countries and many nations in Asia are all
part of eduGAIN. In these federations user accounts aremaintained
by higher education and research institutes, meaning that a higher
level of confidence is achieved than with self-registered authenti-
cation sources like socialmedia. ExpensiveHigh PerformanceCom-
puting, Grid and Cloud resources as well as Journal Subscriptions
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are being provisioned to users based on this technology. There-
fore, it is important all tools that are used by researchers can be
integrated with SAML. This article discusses a novel, clean solution
of SAML integration for OpenStack Cloud, which is increasingly
becoming the most used cloud technology in the research scene.
The result of our work is an OpenStack module called regsite and
an overall OpenStack deployment layout we suggest in this article.
Regsite was developed to achieve a certain set of desirable
engineering properties lacked by earlier solutions. One of these
was encapsulation [2] of new functionality within a self-contained
module. This was especially important, because the alternative –
implementing the functionality via source code patches to Open-
Stack – requires an update of the patches every time the host code
changes. In the case of OpenStack’s half-year release cycle, the nec-
essary changes would have been frequent. Also, the merging of the
functionality to one of the OpenStack mainline components would
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.softx.2018.12.003
2352-7110/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
M. Héder, S. Tenczer and A. Biancini / SoftwareX 9 (2019) 44–48 45
haveundermined itsmodularity, and theOpenStack developerswe
contacted also advised against it.
Reuse of mature components [3] was also targeted for devel-
opment. This mostly involved the reuse of SAML-related software
components. Thehandling of SAMLprotocol andmetadata requires
complex logic, and since these components implement authentica-
tion, the correct design and implementation is critical to security.
As a result, the development of any new SAML-related code was
avoided.
Full compatibility with SAML federations was set as a goal. This
resulted in federated login, logout, the latestmetadata defining the
IdPs, metadata refresh, and the use of Virtual Organization Man-
agement Systems supporting SAML Attribute Authority interface,
even multiple ones, in the same session. Compliance with legal
requirements (such as the need of informed consent of attribute
release) was also essential.
Delegation of administration [4], in this case, user provisioning
and authorization by external systems, was also achieved. SAML
federations have a number of solutions for Virtual Organization
and Virtual Group management [5] that can be relied on. All of the
above properties helped contribute to our overarching goal of easy,
long-term operation and maintenance.
1.1. A short description of SAML and OpenStack
SAML [6] identity and attribute federations are common in
the research and education environment. They allow users to use
their home institution credentials to access resources at partner
institutions. This is achieved through the exchange of digitally
signed XML [7] assertions. There are three major roles in mature
SAML federations: service providers (SPs) [8], identity providers
(IdPs) [9], and attribute authorities (AAs) [10]. SPs provide re-
sources for users. In this case study, an OpenStack [11] cloud is
such a resource, with OpenStack as the SP. IdPs are sources of
user identity information that the SPs and AAs trust. Attribute
authorities (AAs) are sources of user attributes that SPs trust.
While user data in IdPs are managed by the HR department of
institutes and by the administrative departments of universities
and colleges, groups and virtual organizations are managed by
inter-organization collaborations. Trust between these entities is
pre-established through the exchange of signedmetadata [12] that
contains signing keys, trusted network endpoints and administra-
tive information.
OpenStack is an open source, Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IAAS)
[13] cloud system that is designed to be modular. The focus of this
paper is on the authentication and authorization functionalities
of the OpenStack system, which are designed to be highly config-
urable and extensible. Initially, OpenStack did not support SAML
federations. There have been a number of previous integration ef-
forts (detailed in Relatedwork) trying to resolve issues in this area.
The twomodules involved in the authentication and authorization
process are Keystone [14], OpenStack’s authentication component,
and Horizon [15], the system’s web interface.
1.2. Related work
(A) In 2012, the University of Kent initiated a project to SAML-
enable Keystone and OpenStack [16,17]. One drawback of this
pioneering solutionwas that it did not include the reuse of existing
middleware to handle the SAML protocol, but instead, it relied on
SAMLprogramming libraries to implement its own SAML function-
ality. As a result, it did not achieve full SAML compatibility: it did
not handle external attribute authorities, and it did not consume
SAML metadata. Instead, OpenStack maintained a list of trusted
IdPs in its own database format and consequently the updates
to the metadata did not automatically come to effect in these
deployments.
(B) In 2014, as a part of the HEXAA [18] project a new solution
was created [19] based on Shibboleth [20] as SAML middleware,
and on OpenStack’s ability to rely on external authenticationmod-
ules. The results were presented at OpenStack CEE Day 2015 [20].
The main issue with this solution was that its source code was not
encapsulated, but acted as a patch for the main OpenStack code-
base, and therefore, would require future significant maintenance.
(C) A completely new solution was included in the 2015–1
KILO [21] release of OpenStack. The primary assignee was Red
Hat, with additional contributors from CERN and IBM [22]. The
University of Kent contributed significantly to the Kilo release by
replacing the SAML dependent code with protocol independent
code. Also the matching rule code was primarily Kent’s, taken
from their original implementation. The approach was detailed
at the OpenStack Cloud Identity Summit (slides 23–38) [23]. The
solution is called WebSSO, a protocol-agnostic federation mod-
ule that works with OpenID [24], SAML, and other protocols. As
WebSSO does not include SAML-related code, it makes it possible
to encapsulate SAML functionality in a mature SAML middleware
component. Shibboleth, mod_shib [25], and the resulting Apache
environment is used for authentication. Using the WebSSO solu-
tion with Shibboleth achieves full compatibility, reuse of mature
components and encapsulation. However, it is not able to create
users, tenants and projects within OpenStack. Therefore, either
each user must first be created in OpenStack before s/he can login
via WebSSO or they need to be ephemeral users. As a result, the
WebSSO solution does not fully achieve delegation of administra-
tion in permanent user mode, while in ephemeral mode (where no
user creation is necessary) CLI is unavailable. Themodule described
in this paper is a converged solution to overcome this problem,
based on WebSSO.
(D) There is also Keystone-to-Keystone SAML flow, supported
by OpenStack. In this, Keystone acts as an IdP, and another Key-
stone instance as SP (see the OpenStack Cloud Identity Summit
presentation (slide 40) [26]. This solution is not compatible with
SAML federations, as it does not consume SAML metadata, and
also does not reuse mature components. However, it might be a
viable solution for a completely different use case, in which an
OpenStack user database is the identity source to be trusted by
a federation. This approach allows cloud bursting or outsourcing




Our solution required a number of software design decisions
to be made based on the design criteria outlined in the intro-
duction. The most important was that OpenStack should be used
in combination with mature, in-production (proven on Technol-
ogy Readiness Level 9 [27]) software, so that proper handling of
SAML-level actionswere not demanded fromOpenStack itself. This
includes: (a) metadata handling, as per eduGAIN or other feder-
ation requirements, with signature verification, (b) handling of
stand-alone AAs, (c) collaboration with discovery services, and (d)
SAML single logout. As previously discussed, using OpenStackwith
mature SAML middleware achieved our goal of reusing mature
components.
Moreover, it was important that the new software should not
only be a patch to the OpenStackHorizon or Keystone components.
Because of the encapsulation of new functionality in its own mod-
ule, no regular patching of any other OpenStack components will
be necessary. Python andDjango [28]were selected for consistency
with other OpenStack components.
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Fig. 1. The architecture and themain workflow of the collaboration between SAML
federations and OpenStack. The software solution presented here is an OpenStack
module called ‘‘regsite’’.
It was also key to align the software with the OpenStack Key-
stone project’s vision for the future. At the OpenStack CEE Day
2015 event, a converged solution for the future was agreed upon.
From the solution B (the letters refer to the paragraphs in section
‘‘Related work’’ above), the user/project creation part would be
separated into a standalone ‘signup page’ web application, using
Keystone API calls, and the user/project/tenant created at signup,
if necessary. The mainline code would then perform the rest of the
authentication and map the SAML session to Keystone users. By
2018 this was achieved via the Shadowmapping [29] capability of
OpenStack that regsite leverages. The rest of the B solution would
be discontinued, and Horizon would not be patched in the future.
It was indicated that the OpenStack Keystone project is open to
accept improvement patches to C as long as they do not involve
user/tenant creation (or de-provisioning).
The resulting software, regsite, in collaboration with WebSSO
(see Related work), implements the desirable engineering proper-
ties.
2.2. Software functionalities
User provisioning: The solution needed to ensure that the user is
always properly provisioned into Keystone before it makes contact
with OpenStack. Otherwise, the user would successfully login into
Shibboleth federation middleware, but would be denied access
and greeted with an error message from Keystone. According to
our design criteria, this should not be implemented by adding a
patch to an OpenStack module. As a result, we relied on the ses-
sionHook [30] ability of Shibboleth SP instead. The user identifier
received from the SAML IdP will be used without modification by
OpenStack as username.
Consent: The software also needed to include themeans to request
user consent since personal data is transmitted from the SAML
federation and stored in OpenStack. This is achieved by a website
presented to the user, if necessary.
Role and project provisioning: In the entitlement string sent by
the SAMLAA for authorization, projects and roles are derived in the
following way: ‘‘<entitlement_prefix>:project:role’’. However, the
project and role could be non-existent at the first access. Regsite
creates these resources as needed at first access. Additionally,
regsite makes it possible to be assigned to multiple projects at the
same time.
Password setup for CLI access: Since there is no widespread im-
plementation of non-web SAML access (Moonshot [31] is a solution
but not supported bymany IdPs and federations), a password is still
necessary for using the command line interface of OpenStack. This
password cannot be used on theweb interface; it is solely intended
to be used by scripts.
User authentication and authorization:When all the preliminary
steps are done regsite with WebSSO maps the user account in-
formation to a local OpenStack user and assigns the user to the
roles and projects as described by the entitlement attribute. If
the contents of this attribute change the assignments will be re-
aligned.
User deprovisioning: When a user’s federation memberships are
terminated the associated resources – virtual machines, storage,
etc. – are not deleted automatically. Regsite provides hooks that
may be triggered by the SAMLAA or IdPwhen a user’s entitlements
are removed or the user itself is deleted. This makes it possible
to implement automatic clean-up procedures. With regsite, it is
possible to de-enroll from certain project only and this happens
at the next login attempt.
Fig. 2 shows the place of these functions (except deprovisioning
and CLI password setup).
3. Illustrative examples
The numbered arrows on Fig. 1 show the default workflow of
regsite. The inner logic of regsite is depicted in Fig. 2. The following
workflow demonstrates how a federated user gets provisioned,
authenticated and authorized for at first time access of a regsite-
enabled OpenStack instance. The numbering refers to Fig. 1.
The workflow steps are as follows:
(i) The user tries to access the OpenStack Horizonweb interface
with a web browser.
(ii) Horizon redirects the user to the Keystone component’sweb
endpoint.
(iii) TheKeystone component is hosted by anApacheweb server
and is guarded by a Shibboleth SP. The user does not have a Shibbo-
leth session yet, therefore a SAML login sequence is initiated. The
user forwarded to a SAML IdP discovery service, where s/he can
select an identity provider.
(iv) The discovery service forwards the user to the IdP.
(v) The user logs in at the identity provider using his/her home
institutional credentials.
(vi) Additional profile attributes, and authoritative information
is gathered from external attribute authorities, as defined by the
SP’s configuration. The number of AAs contacted can range from
0 to many, however, the SP sequentially queries the AAs, which
aggregates the round-trip times of the single queries. Meanwhile,
the user is blocked, which suggests that querying more than five
AAs is not practical.
(vii) Shibboleth SP merges and filters the received attributes,
then executes its configured sessionHook. It forwards the user to a
location hosted on the same server as the SP, which also relays all
the attributes gathered during the login process. In sessionHook,
Shibboleth SP passes over the identity, profile and authoritative
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Fig. 2. The flowchart demonstrating some functionalities of regsite.
information to regsite. Steps (iii) to (vii) can all be completed by
a standard Shibboleth SP.
(viii) regsite creates the user and the tenant, if necessary, using
Keystone API calls.
(ix) regsite directs the user back into the Shibboleth login se-
quence.
(x) The Shibboleth login sequence finishes, and the user finally
reaches Keystone. The same set of information is passed in Apache
Environment variables to Keystone, as in Step (vii), to regsite.
(xi) Step (viii) ensures that the user is already existent in Key-
stone, as well as the tenants they are assigned to, therefore, Key-
stone successfully authenticates the user.
(xii) Keystone creates a token for the user.
(xiii) Keystone redirects the user to the Horizon web interface,
accompanied by the newly created token. Horizon authenticates
the user using this token and access is granted.
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4. Impact
As the result of our work, an OpenStack deployment installed
from the mainline source code or by a deployment tool can now
be configured to use eduGAIN or other SAML federation for user
authentication and any SAML Attribute Authority for user autho-
rization. No patching or other changes that hindermaintenance are
necessary.
Researchers and students can use their home accounts to access
the cloud. Authorization can be managed by the given research
community that by a Virtual Organization management software
that has SAMLAA interface (which is themajority now). Thismeans
that users and their corresponding roles and resources can be
provisioned in an OpenStack installation without the intervention
of either the OpenStack administrators or the administrators of the
SAML IdP. This removes the two most significant bottlenecks from
research cloud access while providing Single Sign-On for the users
and the ability to user their home credentials and not having to
remember new credentials.
Regsite is free and open source software available for everyone
to use. Because of this, the authors cannot know exactly how
many deployments use it. However, the two major research and
education cloud deployments in Hungary – The ‘‘MTA Cloud’’ [32]
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the ‘‘C4E’’ [33] cloud for
education project of the KIFU institute – both use it as the exclusive
means of cloud access. In MTA Cloud several dozen of national and
international physics, chemistry and biology projects use it, while
the usage of C4E is increasing by the Higher Education community.
The requests reaching the authors indicate that our software
is being tried out by several research-oriented OpenStack deploy-
ments worldwide.
5. Conclusions
This paper presented a new method of collaboration between
OpenStack cloud systems and mature SAML federations. Such col-
laborationwasmade possible by themodular design of OpenStack,
which supports customized authentication and authorization, and
by the generic nature of Shibboleth SAML middleware.
The regsite module exhibits key engineering properties essen-
tial for long-term operation of deployed systems andmaintenance
of regsite code. Encapsulation of the new functionality necessary
for the integration of OpenStack cloud systems and mature SAML
federations is key for source code maintenance, while the reuse of
mature components helps tominimize the size of that source code.
Full compatibility with SAML ensures that the services provided
by the federation – i.e. metadata distribution, discovery services,
single login, and single logout – can be used. The fact that there is
a very loose coupling between the systems, e.g. Shibboleth hides
all SAML-related actions from OpenStack, and regsite relies on a
small portion of KeystoneAPI, ensures that the inevitable evolution
of SAML federations and OpenStack will not endanger the easy
maintenance of the collaboration.
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